Framework for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety Risk Management by Speijker, L.J.P. et al.
NLR-TP-2011-324 
 
 
Executive summary 
 
 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
This report is based on a paper to be published in the SAE International 
Journal of Aerospace. This paper will be presented at the SAE AeroTech 
Congress & Exhibition, 18-21 October 2011, Toulouse, France. 
Report no. 
NLR-TP-2011-324 
 
Author(s) 
L.J.P. Speijker 
X. Lee 
R. van de Leijgraaf 
 
Report classification 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
Date 
August 2011 
 
Knowledge area(s) 
Vliegveiligheid (safety & 
security) 
     
Descriptor(s) 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Safety Risk Management 
Safety Case 
Mid air collision 
Ground collision 
     
FRAMEWORK FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS SAFETY 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
  
 
Problem area 
Although Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) have now for 
some time been used in 
segregated airspace where 
separation from other air traffic 
can be assured, potential users 
have interests to deploy UAS in 
non segregated airspace. Recent 
technological and operational 
improvements give reason to 
believe that UAS safety and 
performance capabilities are 
maturing. But the skies can only 
really open up to UAS when 
there is an agreed upon UAS 
safety policy with commonly 
accepted UAS Safety Risk 
Management (SRM) processes 
enabling to show that the risks 
related to UAS operations in all 
the different airspace classes 
can be adequately controlled so 
that the current and existing 
safety level does not decrease. 
 
Description of work 
This study proposes a UAS SRM 
framework, which supports 
regulators and applicants 
through provision of guidelines 
for SRM steps to be conducted, 
including 1) system description, 
2) hazard identification, 3) risk 
analysis, 4) risk assessment, and 
5) risk treatment. Unmanned 
Aircraft System developments in 
four areas (platforms, control 
stations, communication and 
data-links, and operations) are 
discussed. Differences between 
manned and unmanned aircraft 
and the specific areas that could 
have specific safety implications 
are identified and analysed. A 
survey of UAS activities provides 
an initial view on the risks and 
hazards to be considered, the 
needs and role of potential SRM 
users, the scope of the aviation 
system to be considered, the 
risks to be regulated, selection 
of suitable risk metrics, and the 
setting of an acceptable level of 
safety. The focus is on the 
provision of guidelines for steps 
2 to 4 of a UAS SRM process, 
covering both risk of a mid air 
collision with another (manned) 
aircraft and risk of collision with 
the ground. A framework for 
building the Safety Case for UAS 
operations in non segregated 
airspace is proposed. Key 
recommendations for the 
application and validation of the 
proposed UAS SRM processes 
are identified and provided. 
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Results and conclusions 
A survey of UAS activities has 
provided an initial view on the 
risks and hazards to be 
considered, the needs and role 
of potential SRM users, the 
scope of the aviation system to 
be considered, the risks to be 
regulated, selection of suitable 
risk metrics, and the setting of 
an acceptable level of safety. It 
is motivated that the main safety 
risks to be addressed to ensure 
that UAS can be introduced in 
non segregated airspace without 
degrading safety are risks to 
other airspace users and third 
party risk (to people/property 
on the ground). It is necessary to 
show that these risks do not 
increase as compared to the 
current aviation system with 
manned aircraft only. 
 
The proposed SRM process 
follows five sequential steps: 
1. Describe the system to be 
introduced or changed; 
2. Identify the associated 
hazards and causal factors; 
3. Analyze risks (characterise 
the risk elements in terms of 
both hazard severity and 
likelihood of occurrence); 
4. Assess risks (and provide 
results for decision making); 
5. Treat/control the risks (i.e. 
mitigate, monitor and track). 
 
The proposed SRM process for 
risks to other airspace users is 
based on comparison of the 
collision risk for a baseline of 
commercial air traffic versus a 
traffic mix that includes UAS, 
using ICAO’s unified framework 
for collision risk modelling. The 
proposed SRM process for third 
party risk is based on a method 
that combines an accident 
probability model with an 
accident location model and an 
accident consequence model, 
through answering the following 
three key safety risk questions: 
1. What is the chance that a 
UAS accident occurs?  
2. What is the likelihood of a 
UAS accident occurring on a 
given location, given that a 
UAS accident occurred?  
3. What is the consequence of a 
UAS accident, given that a 
UAS accident occurred at a 
given location?  
 
This paper provides guidelines 
for the establishment of a UAS 
risk criteria framework, but the 
actual implementation of such a 
framework should preferably be 
done jointly by a regulatory 
working group that includes the 
European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA), Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and/or the 
Joint Authorities for Rulemaking 
on Unmanned Systems (JARUS). 
 
Applicability 
It is recommended to apply and 
validate the proposed SRM 
process with an operational 
concept brought forward by UAS 
standardization working group 
EUROCAE WG73 or RTCA-SC203.
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ABSTRACT 
Although Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have now for 
some time been used in segregated airspace where separation 
from other air traffic can be assured, potential users have 
interests to deploy UAS in non segregated airspace. Recent 
technological and operational improvements give reason to 
believe that UAS safety and performance capabilities are 
maturing. But the skies can only really open up to UAS when 
there is an agreed upon UAS safety policy with commonly 
accepted UAS Safety Risk Management (SRM) processes 
enabling to show that the risks related to UAS operations in all 
the different airspace classes can be adequately controlled. 
The overall objective is to develop a UAS SRM framework, 
supporting regulators and applicants through provision of 
detailed guidelines for each SRM step to be conducted, 
including 1) system description, 2) hazard identification, 3) 
risk analysis, 4) risk assessment, 5) risk treatment. The 
purpose is that all potential risks of the newly proposed UAS 
operations are controlled so that the existing safety level does 
not decrease (i.e. provides the baseline from which safety 
requirements for new proposed UAS operations are derived).  
A survey of UAS activities provides an initial view on the 
risks and hazards to be considered, the needs and role of 
potential SRM users, the scope of the aviation system to be 
considered, the risks to be regulated, selection of suitable risk 
metrics, and the setting of an acceptable level of safety. It is 
motivated that the main safety risks that need to be addressed 
to ensure that UAS can be introduced in non segregated 
airspace without degrading safety are risks to other airspace 
users and third party risk (to objects on the ground).  It will be 
necessary to show that these risks do not increase as compared 
to the current aviation system with manned aircraft only. 
 
This paper focuses on the provision of guidelines for steps 2 to 
4 of a UAS SRM process, covering both types of risks. The 
process for third party risk is based on a method that combines 
an accident probability model with an accident location model 
and an accident consequence model. This method enables 
evaluation of both individual risk and societal risk, and 
provides insight into probability and consequences of collision 
of a UAS with the ground. A method that addresses potential 
conflict scenarios (e.g. level busts, aircraft levelling of at the 
wrong flight level, flight track deviations due to operational 
errors) is proposed as basis for analysis of the risk of UAS to 
other airspace users. It is explained how the results may be 
used to build a Safety Case for UAS operations in non 
segregated airspace. Recommendations for application and 
validation of the proposed SRM process are also provided.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
As UAS are further developed, their introduction into the civil 
aviation market is considered seriously. Operation of UAS is 
most beneficial when they are not restricted to a designated, 
limited piece of (segregated) airspace. Though UAS have now 
for some time been used in segregated airspace where 
separation from other air traffic can be assured, many see 
requirements to deploy UAS also in Non-Segregated Airspace.  
If UAS are to operate in non-segregated airspace, they must be 
integrated safely and adhere to the same operational practices 
as conventional manned aircraft. In addition to the need for 
reliable communications links between the UAS, its ground 
control station and the ground-based air traffic control, the 
lack of a human onboard to monitor the aircraft environment 
is a serious concern for the aviation community. As a result, 
the aviation community is investigating various concepts, 
systems and technologies to compensate for the loss of the 
onboard pilot. In addition to challenges for the design of the 
UAS itself, there are new challenges as well as new 
opportunities for the design of the Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) in the future, including the context of the Single 
European Sky ATM Research (SESAR), Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) and beyond.  
But the skies can only really open up to UAS when there is an 
agreed upon UAS safety policy with commonly accepted UAS 
SRM processes enabling to show that the risks and hazards 
related to UAS operations in Non Segregated Airspace can be 
adequately controlled. A SRM process – which contains 
guidelines for e.g. hazard identification, risk analysis and risk 
assessment – is required to be followed by applicants of new 
proposed UAS operations [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 21]. 
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The objective of this paper is to provide a framework for a 
UAS SRM method. The purpose of this method is twofold: a) 
to assist applicants (e.g. UAS operators and manufacturers, air 
navigation service providers and/or airport authorities) in the 
different steps of a UAS SRM process, and b) to support 
regulators with UAS risk assessment and mitigation in support 
of the establishment of UAS certification procedures, 
airworthiness standards, and operational requirements. 
 
Before developing guidelines for UAS SRM, it is first of all 
necessary to understand the differences between manned and 
unmanned aircraft and the specific areas that could have safety 
implications. UAS are manufactured in a seemingly unlimited 
variety of sizes, speeds and operational envelopes. Even 
though there seems to be consensus that UAS will have to act 
and respond as much as possible as manned aircraft do, key 
differences exist and their safety implications will need to 
identified and evaluated during the early stage of UAS SRM. 
 
Section 2 discusses UAS developments in the following UAS 
areas: platforms, control stations, communication and data-
links, and operations.  Section 3 provides SRM considerations, 
including scope of the risk assessment, users and their needs, 
and the different roles of stakeholders. Section 4 deals with the 
development of a risk criteria framework, including risks to be 
regulated, the suitability of risk metrics, and the setting of an 
acceptable safety level. Section 5 presents the proposed SRM 
methodology. Section 6 explained how the results of a UAS 
SRM process may be used to build a Safety Case for UAS 
operations in non-segregated airspace. Conclusions and 
recommendations are provided in Section 7. Finally, the 
references are contained in Section 8. 
 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
ICAO states “an unmanned aerial vehicle is a pilotless aircraft, 
in the sense of Article 8 of the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation [1], which is flown without a pilot-in-command 
on-board and is either remotely and fully controlled from 
another place (ground, another aircraft, space) or programmed 
and fully autonomous” [3]. Unmanned Aircraft (UA) are 
aircraft, and therefore existing ICAO Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) apply to a large extent. It is 
however recognized that integration of UAS at airports and in 
the various airspace classes necessitates the development of 
UAS-specific SARPs to supplement those already existing [2]. 
There is a broad potential scope for UAS. Missions include 
commercial, scientific and security applications, involving 
monitoring, surveillance, communications and imaging. Tasks 
include border and maritime patrol, search and rescue, fire 
detection, natural disaster monitoring, contamination 
measurement, road traffic surveillance, power and pipeline 
inspection, and earth observation. UAS are suited for use as 
communication relays and are already used for commercial 
imaging purposes such as aerial photography and video. 
The following ICAO terminology is presently used [2]: 
 Unmanned Aircraft. An aircraft which is intended to 
operate with no pilot on-board. 
 Unmanned Aircraft System. An aircraft and its associated 
elements which is operated with no pilot on-board. 
 
According to ICAO, the key factor for safely integrating UAS 
in non-segregated airspace will be their ability to act and 
respond as manned aircraft do [2]. This will be subject to 
technology – the ability of the aircraft to be controlled by the 
remote pilot, to act as a communications relay between remote 
pilot and Air Traffic Control (ATC), the performance of the 
communications link, as well as the timeliness of the aircraft 
response to ATC instructions. Performance-based SARPs may 
be needed for each of these aspects [2]. To support the 
establishment of such performance based SARPs, recent 
European UAS technological and operational developments 
have been analysed from four different points of views: 
platforms, control stations, communication and data-links, and 
operations. This provides a baseline for understanding of UAS 
developments and their safety implications and concerns. 
 
UAS platforms 
Developments of UAS in Europe are significantly less than 
those in the USA, or in Israel. European developments are, 
more than in the USA and Israel, aimed at small-sized UAS. 
Especially when considering non-military applications of 
UAS, the bulk of UAS developments are for small-sized 
vehicles. Such systems are typically used for short range 
missions, such as aerial photography, inspection of for 
instance chimneys, fire control and surveillance by police. It is 
expected that civil UAS will be used in the near future for two 
main reasons: 1) information gathering and 2) transport of 
goods. Not much evidence has been found for the often named 
third category of usage named relay station (relaying of radio 
signals to facilitate over-the-horizon communications or 
dedicated communications in build-up areas). Given the 
highly crowded spectrum, the aircraft separation issues and 
operating costs, it is doubtful whether such an application will 
be used civilly on a day-to-day basis. Since the requirements 
to allow UAS to autonomously use a runway for take-off and 
landing are relatively strict, it follows that the resulting 
equipment demands also become more expensive as compared 
to the smaller UAS. The result of the relatively expensive 
equipment is that the size of UAS is divided more-or-less into 
two broad categories: the small and tiny UAS and the larger 
UAS. Smaller UAS normally use simpler sensors and hence 
the lower part of the airspace, whilst larger UAS employ more 
sophisticated sensor suites and are targeted at flying at higher 
altitudes. UAS are manufactured in seemingly unlimited 
variety of sizes, speeds and operational envelopes. Although 
in the future faster UAS types are foreseen, current UAS are 
flying relatively slow as compared to commercial air traffic. 
As a result of larger speed differences between manned and 
unmanned aircraft there is a risk in controlled airspace that Air 
Traffic Controllers (ATCO) errors may becoming more 
frequent as a result of increased workload or errors may 
escalate more quickly. In uncontrolled airspace large speed 
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differences are a confirmed hazard. ATCOs should be aware 
of the performance characteristics of all traffic in their sector, 
and thus also of any performance limitations of UAS. This is a 
matter of ATCO training and instruction primarily, but may 
lead to minimum performance requirements being imposed on 
UAS to facilitate normal operations in the ATM system. 
UAS ground control stations 
UAS Control Station (UCS) design and developments have (at 
least until recent) been targeted at specific UAS. Although 
some standardization effort has taken place like depicted in 
NATO STANAG 4586 [4], the majority of UCS lack 
commonality to allow the control of other UAS. As such, the 
UAS and UCS are certified for operation as a tandem system. 
The safety emphasis is often placed on the UAS, assuming 
that the UCS is not flight-critical. UAS operators fulfill 
different tasks, and there are often operator positions for 
mission planning and sensor data processing. A proper 
cooperation is crucial for a safe effective mission. Specific 
safety related issues are related to Human Machine Interface 
(HMI) design, UAS control versus sensor control, crew 
resource management, incorporation of multi-UAS control 
using one control station, and training issues, including 
assessment of the operator capabilities. How should you 
assemble a UAS crew? What should their expertise be? How 
should their tasks be allocated? In what way can multiple UAS 
be operated simultaneously by the fewest number of people? 
 
UAS communications and data links 
A key element in the ATM system is direct communication 
between air traffic controllers and pilots. With the introduction 
of UAS, a major change is the introduction of a data-link 
between UAS crew and the unmanned aircraft, through which 
voice (and data) communications with ATC are relayed. This 
may be a direct data-link between control station and 
unmanned aircraft, but could also be relayed further via 
satellites or even via other unmanned aircraft. Especially 
latency in the voice communications (by using additional 
relays such as satellites) raises concerns. Although emergency 
procedures exist for safely handing loss of communications 
with (manned) aircraft, and these may be used similarly for 
unmanned aircraft there is a limit on the acceptable rate of 
voice communications loss. All inputs regarding navigation, 
and command and control from the UAS crew will be 
transferred via a data-link as well. This implies that the 
integrity and reliability of the data link will have a direct and 
crucial impact on the level of safety. Issues and factors that 
can degrade the quality of the data link (including e.g. latency, 
jamming, spoofing, hacking) will have to be considered. If the 
command and control data-link connection is lost, technology 
and sound emergency procedures will need to be in place to 
mitigate the safety hazards. UAS data links are important for 
controlling the UAS and the sensors and communicate with 
ATC. Unfortunately the use of data links could be limited by 
several factors, including e.g. 1) frequency allocation, 2) 
bandwidth limitations, 3) power consumption constraints, 4) 
solar activity, 5) satellite coverage, and 6) backup strategies. 
 
UAS operations 
As compared to manned aircraft, there is a larger variety of 
missions for UAS. Each mission and associated operation may 
bring forward safety issues (still) to be resolved. For local 
infrastructure inspection missions, containment of the UAS to 
the local area and avoidance of ground obstacles and other 
traffic is critical. For area surveillance missions, one has to 
address prevention of collisions, integration of slow flying 
UAS in the ATM system with faster manned air traffic, 
handling of failures and emergencies, aerodrome operations, 
data-link availability and integrity, area needed for slow climb 
to operational altitude, monitoring two UAS from one control 
station (avoiding confusion of the UAS pilot, incorrect hand-
over of control between UAS, or data-link interference).  
 
The fact that the pilot in command is not situated in a UAS 
undermines traditional operational concepts with three conflict 
layers: 1) strategic conflict management, 2) separation 
provision, and 3) collision avoidance. Depending on airspace 
class and flight rules under which the UAS and other traffic 
are operating, the pilot may be responsible for separation 
provision, where ATC does not provide it. In any case the 
pilot is at all times ultimately responsibility for collision 
avoidance, traditionally achieved by ‘see and avoid’. These 
tasks will need to be solved by e.g. using a visual observer on 
the ground (so-called visual light of sight operations) or in a 
chase aircraft, or, using detect and avoid systems to enable a 
remote pilot to fulfill his responsibilities. For any solution, it 
has to be demonstrated that it does not decrease safety levels.  
There is consensus about the fact that established operational 
procedures for ATC and for UAS pilots should be applicable 
as much as possible and adjusted only when really needed. 
‘Equivalence’ between manned aircraft and UAS implies e.g.: 
• ATC and other airspace users must be able to determine 
courses of actions as they do for other air users in all 
equivalent circumstances; 
• UAS should be operated in compliance to existing 
operation rules (minimum rule changes); 
• Provision of ATC to a UAS must be transparent. ATC 
must not do anything different using Radio Telephony, 
Controller Pilot Data Link Communications or landlines 
than he/she would do with manned aircraft. 
 
It is suggested to introduce additional separation for a UAS (as 
compared to manned aircraft) so as to cope with a delay in 
reaction time because of the distance between the UAS and 
the ground control station (especially when using satellite 
relay stations). For the UAS pilot, it would means that he/she 
could file additional UAS specific information in the flight 
plan. For UAS missions performed in certain areas, it is 
foreseen that additional co-ordination between ATC and the 
UAS pilot (regarding horizontal/vertical mission area limits) 
takes place. With respect to emergency procedures, new 
specific ATC emergency procedures seem to be needed for 
cases that require additions or modifications to current 
standards: voice communication failure, loss of control link, 
abort procedures following critical system failure.  
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UAS SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT 
CONSIDERATIONS 
It will not be possible to introduce UAS in Non Segregated 
Airspace, if it cannot be shown that the associated risks and 
hazards can be adequately regulated and controlled. ICAO 
states “The principal objective of the aviation regulatory 
framework is to achieve and maintain the highest possible and 
uniform level of safety. In the case of UAS, this means 
ensuring the safety of any other airspace user as well as the 
safety of persons and property on the ground.” [2]. 
Before developing a specific plan for UAS SRM, it is first 
necessary to understand UAS safety policies and guidance 
provided by the regulators. The FAA provides information and 
guidance on air traffic policies, and prescribes procedures for 
the planning, coordination, and services involving operation of 
UAS in United States’ National Aviation System (NAS) [13, 
14]. This is supported by the FAA National Aviation Research 
Program, which applies Safety Management System (SMS) 
principles to UAS [5]. Guidance material for Air Traffic SRM 
is provided in the FAA SMS Manual [9]. Key SRM elements 
are ‘risk analysis’ and ‘risk assessment’. FAA Order 8080.4 
[6] prescribes that ‘a case specific plan for risk analysis and 
risk assessment shall be predetermined in adequate detail for 
appropriate review and agreement by the decision making 
authority prior to commitment of resources. The plan shall 
additionally describe criteria for acceptable risk’. In Europe, 
EASA provides guidance for UAS airworthiness certification 
[15, 16] and a preliminary regulatory impact assessment [17], 
which recommends initiation of a rulemaking task intended to 
reduce the safety/environmental/economic risks identified in 
relation to UAS. Additionally, it is noted that for introducing 
and/or planning changes to the ATM system, in Europe also 
an ATM safety risk analysis is required by EUROCONTROL 
Safety Regulatory Requirement (ESARR) 4 [10]. 
So far, UAS are mostly used in segregated airspace under 
specific requirements. Therefore, with respect to SRM of UAS 
operations in Non-Segregated Airspace, it is a difficulty that 
there is only limited UAS safety data, which ‘may not be a 
representative sampling of UAS operations’ [27]. The accident 
rate of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was 
estimated at 52.7 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, which is 
more than seven times the general aviation accident rate and 
353 times the commercial aviation accident rate [27]. As a 
consequence, it will be reasonable to employ default or 
conservative assumptions for particular hazards that cannot be 
quantified on the basis of historical data. It is furthermore 
expected that a) risks or hazards may be identified for which 
estimation of hazard severity or likelihood of occurrence may 
turn out to be difficult prior to implementation, b) the decision 
makers may have to deal with unknown risks or hazards. This 
issue is recognized by the FAA, which has initiated research to 
support integration of UAS in the NAS [21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. 
USER NEEDS 
The aviation safety regulatory authority will have to provide 
the regulations for civil aviation, based on the ICAO Annexes 
and connected to a legal system. The regulator will have to 
issue a license or certificate subjects (objects, organizations or 
individuals) within civil aviation, and subsequently monitor 
the licensed or certificated subjects for continued compliance 
with requirements, e.g. by performing inspections or audits,  
proficiency checks, and review of documents. A regulator 
could commission its own risk assessment (or second opinion 
by an independent agency) to provide appropriate assurances 
and review risk assessments submitted by e.g. UAS operators.  
 
For UAS operators, meeting the minimum safety standards set 
by the aviation authorities is a necessary requirement for 
obtaining an Air Operator Certificate (AOC). For continued 
airworthiness, UAS operators have the responsibility for 
maintenance, inspection and repair actions. This is based on 
maintenance procedures specified in a maintenance program. 
To obtain a license/certificate, a UAS operator will have to 
submit a risk assessment and supporting safety case, relating 
to flying the UAS bearing in mind built-up areas, heavily used 
controlled airspace and the proximity of objects on the ground.  
 
For UAS manufacturers, a distinction has to be made between 
UAS larger than 150 kg and UAS smaller than 150 kg. EASA 
has issued a Policy regarding airworthiness certification of the 
larger UAS [16]. JARUS is drafting specifications regarding 
safety requirements for the smaller UAS. These requirements 
are based on the principle that an inverse relation should exist 
between the probability of malfunctions and the degree of the 
hazards. These safety requirements for UAS may be different 
than for manned aircraft (as specified in Paragraph 1309 of 
FAR CS 23/25 [11] and EASA CS 23/25 [12]) due to the lack 
of people aboard UAS. Meeting minimum safety requirements 
applicable to aircraft systems is usually necessary to obtain a 
type certificate and a certificate of airworthiness approval.  
 
An Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) is responsible for 
ensuring that air traffic proceeds safely and efficiently while 
minimizing the burden to the environment. An ATM safety 
risk assessment will be needed before ATC service can be 
provided to UAS operating in Non Segregated Airspace. In the 
USA, guidance is provided by FAA-ATO [9]. In Europe, an 
ATM safety risk assessment is required by the ESARR 4 [10]. 
 
The influence of aerodromes on aviation safety is via the 
airside facilities that it provides. Airport safety standards and 
regulations will need to be followed before UAS are allowed 
to take off and/or land. An aerodrome safety management 
system will have rules for aircraft that are to be followed in 
case of e.g. refueling and driving on the apron or manoeuvring 
area. It is possible that airport authorities define specific safety 
procedures for UAS operations. Specific requirements with 
respect to airport risk assessment have not yet been identified. 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2011-324 
August 2011  9 
 
Page 5 of 12 
 
Page 5 of 12 
 
SRM SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
SRM is ‘a formal process within the SMS composed of 
describing the system, identifying hazards, assessing the risk, 
analyzing the risk, and controlling the risk’ [18]. Risk 
Management is defined by ICAO as ‘the identification, 
analysis and elimination (and/or mitigation to an acceptable or 
tolerable level) of those hazards, as well as the subsequent 
risks, that threaten the viability of an organization’ [7]. The 
objective is to ensure that risks associated with hazards to 
flight operations are systematically and formally identified, 
assessed, and managed within acceptable safety levels.  
Any UAS Safety Risk Management process will have to use 
methods to identify and address those safety hazards that 
originate due to the introduction of the proposed UAS 
operation or in which some element of the UAS is a 
contributing factor. Therefore, the UAS SRM process includes 
various requirements and their interactions: 
1. Safe and airworthy UAS (certified and maintained); 
2. Safe operations provided by the UAS operator; 
3. Safe departure and landings spots; 
4. Safe airmanship by a pilot, with a proper airmen licence; 
5. Safe provision of Air Traffic Control services. 
 
The products of a UAS SRM process may, besides safety 
argumentation in support of the introduction of new proposed 
UAS operations, include safety evidence such as e.g. UAS 
safety data, risk models, results from hazard brainstorm 
sessions, risk assessment simulation results and safety 
assurance reports. These products would document and 
support decision-making on the proposed changes that impact 
safety and implement safety enhancements for UAS operation.  
 
A UAS safety risk assessment may have to deal with the entire 
UAS lifecycle, including a) specification b) manufacturing c) 
implementation d) transition to operational service e) 
operational service and f) decommissioning. A primary 
consideration for determining the scope and level of detail is 
what information is required to know enough about the 
change, the associated hazards, and each hazard’s associated 
risk to choose which controls to implement and whether to 
accept the risk of the change. A description of the system and/ 
or proposed change should be complete (at appropriate detail 
level) and correct (accurate, without ambiguity or error) [9]. 
 
UAS RISK CRITERIA FRAMEWORK 
Safety Risk Management is required to maintain or even 
improve the current level of safety. Risk criteria based policies 
for control of major risks have therefore been in use for many 
years. Many of these policies are based on some sort of 
quantification of the risk level that could be allowed to 
continue. This concept of a level of risk has a number of 
implications. Because safety risk of future operations cannot 
be measured directly, an alternative approach for evaluating 
safety is necessary to be able to demonstrate that a certain 
target will be met. Two widely spread safety risk management 
approaches are in use so as to control and regulate safety risks: 
• Target Level of Safety (TLS) approach; 
• As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable (ALARP) approach. 
 
The TLS approach is based on the specification of an 
acceptable value of risk which can be used as a yardstick 
against which the risks associated with a system or procedures 
can be evaluated. The ALARP approach is based on a banded 
assessment of decision structure, which contains a tolerable 
region bounded by maximally negligible and minimally 
unacceptable levels of risk. Within the tolerable region the risk 
must be proven to be ALARP in order to be acceptable.  
Up to now, the most commonly used risk criteria framework 
for aviation safety risk includes a) a single risk metric defined 
in terms of the probability per unit of exposure, and b) a risk 
requirement for this risk metric, which is based on the TLS 
approach. The associated basic methodology for determining 
whether the system is acceptably safe uses an evaluation of the 
system risk against a TLS, which is often expressed in terms 
of a maximum number of fatal accidents per flying hour.  
A commonly accepted risk criteria framework for UAS does 
not yet exist, although proposals have been made and are 
being discussed. A UAS risk criteria framework contains: 
1. Definitions of risks to be regulated; 
2. Definitions of appropriate metrics; 
3. Risk criteria for judging the acceptability of the risks. 
 
UAS RISKS TO BE REGULATED 
The FAA aims to ensure that UAS ‘do no harm’ to other 
operators in the NAS and, to the maximum extent possible, the 
public on the ground’ [26]. FAA supports the introduction of 
UAS in Non-segregated Airspace ‘provided that the risks of 
flying the unmanned aircraft in the civil airspace can be 
appropriately mitigated’ [27]. According to EASA, risks to be 
regulated are ‘collision with people on the ground’ and 
‘collision with other aircraft in flight’ [17]. This is in line with 
EUROCONTROL’s approach, which suggests accounting for 
1) risks to other airspace users 2) third party risk 3) potential 
new risks specifically related to unmanned aircraft [28]. So 
what are the ‘risks’ to be considered and regulated? Clearly 
the concern is that UAS operations might not only interfere 
with commercial and general aviation aircraft operations, but 
will possibly also pose a safety problem for other aircraft and 
objects on the ground. Various international working groups, 
including the regulatory authorities EASA and FAA, the Joint 
Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS), 
the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment 
(EUROCAE) and the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA) are addressing this topic in their work 
program. It is expected that detailed guidelines regarding the 
risks to be regulated will be made available in the near future.  
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RISK METRICS FOR UAS 
It is commonly accepted that risk is not a single quantity, has 
many different aspects, and may be quantified in many 
different ways. Different classes of metrics are distinguished: 
• Risk metrics based on ‘probability of an adverse event (or 
occurrence of undesirable events) per unit of exposure’, 
without considering the possible consequences. 
• Economic risk metric. The sum of expected economic 
losses due to fatalities and loss of equipment, where the 
sum is taken per time period of exposure. For loss due to 
one fatality two types of values are usually used: Value 
Of Life (VOL) and/or Value Willing to Pay (VWP). 
• Individual risk metric. The risk experienced by a single 
individual in a given time period, at a given location. It 
reflects severity of the hazard and amount of time the 
individual is in proximity to the risk. It takes no account 
of numbers of people affected by an event. 
• Societal risk metric. The risk experienced by a group of 
people exposed to the hazard, often expressed as a 
relationship between frequency of, and the number of 
people affected by, an event. There are two societal risk 
metrics: an FN-curve and an expected disutility. 
 
What types of metrics have commonly been used to regulate 
and control aviation safety risk? Aircraft system failure 
probabilities in terms of ‘probability per flight hour’ are used 
as part of the airworthiness certification process to e.g. show 
that any failure condition which would prevent continued safe 
flight and landing is extremely improbable. For aerospace 
system health management, commonly used metrics are 
Probability of Loss of Control and Probability of Loss of 
Vehicle. Two metrics for the collision risk between aircraft are 
e.g. 1) collision probability per movement (e.g. approach, take 
off), and 2) collision probability per year (or expected average 
time interval between two risk events). The collision risk of an 
aircraft with the ground is usually assessed for movements in 
the airport environment (i.e. take off or landing). Metrics used 
to manage third party risk to persons on the ground are usually 
based on individual risk metrics. Such metrics are presently 
used in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom to control 
new housing development and purchasing of existing houses. 
E.g. in the UK, individual risks higher than 10-4 per annum are 
intolerable for the public and those below 10-6 per annum are 
regarded as broadly acceptable. In the Netherlands, in addition 
to criteria based on individual risk, criteria also exist for use of 
F-N curves (a way of presenting group/societal risk) although 
these have not been applied in practice to Dutch airports.  
Which risk metrics are suitable for addressing risks related to 
UAS operations? At least risk metrics have to address a) risk 
of collision with other aircraft, b) risk of collision risk with the 
ground (and/or the associated risk to persons/property on the 
ground). Commonly accepted UAS risk metrics do not yet 
exist, although proposals have been made and are being 
discussed. The following section provides insight in the 
different possibilities for addressing these relevant risks types. 
UAS RISK CRITERIA 
A commonly accepted risk criteria framework for UAS does 
not yet exist. JAA/EUROCONTROL UAV Task Force [29], 
NATO [30, 31], and EASA [15, 16, 17] provide more insight.  
The Joint JAA/EUROCONTROL UAV Task Force was the 
first international effort by aviation authorities to establish an 
acceptable risk criteria framework for UAS operations in 
Europe. This Task Force defined 5 levels of hazard severity: 
• Severity I (“Catastrophic”): UAV is unable to continue 
controlled flight and reach any predefined landing site 
(uncontrolled flight followed by an uncontrolled crash, 
with potentially fatalities or severe damage on ground. 
• Severity II: Failure conditions leading to the controlled 
loss of the UAV over an unpopulated emergency site, 
using Emergency Recovery procedures where required. 
• Severity III: Failure conditions leading to significant 
reduction in safety margins (e.g. total communication loss 
with autonomous flight, landing on predefined emergency 
site that is unpopulated and fulfills certain requirements). 
• Severity IV: Failure conditions leading to slight reduction 
in safety margins (e.g. loss of redundancy). 
• Severity V: Failure conditions leading to no Safety Effect. 
 
No explicit maximum allowable frequencies at which the 
events at the distinct hazard levels may occur are provided. 
However, it is stated that the quantitative safety objective for 
the UAV ‘Severity conditions’ should be set, per UAV 
category, based upon a rationale similar to AMC 25.1309 and 
FAA AC23.1309. The hazard definitions proposed by the 
Task Force only apply to people and property on the ground; 
no such levels are provided for the risk to people in the air. 
 
NATO STANAG 4671 [30] addresses risk criteria for the risks 
to people on the surface. NATO recognizes that because a 
UAV carries no passenger or crew, the consequences of an 
event in terms of casualties cannot be considered with respect 
to the occupants of the aircraft, but only with respect to people 
or property on the ground or on board other (manned) aircraft. 
Compliance should be demonstrated by the approach defined 
by SAE [32], taking into account the following severity 
reference system as defined in AMC.1309 of STANAG 4761: 
• Catastrophic: Failure conditions that result in a worst 
credible outcome of at least uncontrolled flight (including 
flight outside pre-planned or contingency flight profiles/ 
areas) and/or uncontrolled crash, which can potentially 
result in a fatality. Or ‘Failure conditions which could 
potentially result in fatality to UAV crew or ground staff’. 
• Hazardous: Failure conditions that either by themselves 
or in conjunction with increased crew workload, result in 
a worst credible outcome of a controlled-trajectory 
termination or forced landing potentially leading to the 
loss of the UAV where it can be reasonably expected that 
a fatality will not occur. Or “Failure conditions which 
could potentially result in serious injury to UAV crew or 
ground staff”. 
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• Major: Failure conditions that either by themselves or in 
conjunction with increased crew workload, result in a 
worst credible outcome of an emergency landing of the 
UAV on a predefined site where it can be reasonably 
expected that a serious injury will not occur. 
Or “Failure conditions which could potentially result in 
injury to UAV crew or ground staff”. 
• Minor: Failure conditions that do not significantly reduce 
UAV System safety and involve UAV crew actions that 
are well within their capabilities. These conditions may 
include a slight reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities, and a slight increase in UAV crew workload. 
• No safety effect: Failure conditions that have no effect on 
safety. 
 
NATO use a probability level reference system with 5 classes: 
Extremely Improbable, Extremely Remote, Remote, Probable, 
and Frequent (based on occurrence levels per flight hour). The 
risk reference system in STANAG 4671 is based on an inverse 
relationship between the average probability per flight hour 
and severity of the effects of the failure condition (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 STANAG 4761 risk reference system 
This matrix applies to each individual failure condition of each 
UAV subsystem forming the UAV System. Under specific 
conditions STANAG 4671 accepts as alternative that the 
combination of all Catastrophic failure conditions has an 
occurrence of 10-5 per flight hour or less [30]. 
For UAV risks to people in the air, NATO derives the most 
stringent requirement facing unmanned aviation from the need 
for operations with commercial air transport. The probability 
of a mid-air collision must be equivalent to, or better than, 
these standards or 5 x 10-9 per aircraft flight hour [31]. 
EASA considers two possible approaches to certify the 
airworthiness of UAV [15]: 
• Conventional approach, based on a defined airworthiness 
code to the design of aircraft. This approach is common in 
civil manned aviation, and it is a common philosophy of 
this approach that it avoids any presumption of the 
purposes for which the aircraft will be used in service. 
• Safety Target approach, based on setting an overall safety 
objective for the aircraft within the context of a defined 
mission and operating environment. 
EASA initially concludes that the existing civil regulatory 
system has delivered continually improving safety levels 
whilst being flexible enough to cope with the relentless 
evolution and development in aircraft design, and that any 
proposal to depart from the established system in favor of a 
Safety Target approach will be hard to justify today. Hence the 
conventional approach for airworthiness certification is used.  
With regard to UAV risks to people on the surface, initially 
the severity levels and safety objectives used by EASA are 
equal to those established by the JAA/EUROCONTROL UAV 
Task Force [29]. With no persons onboard the aircraft, the 
airworthiness objective is primarily targeted at the protection 
of people and property on the ground. The UAS safety risk 
assessment shall show that the UAS complies with safety 
objectives e.g. the probability level associated with the risk of 
an uncontrolled crash is less than an agreed figure and the 
severity of various potential failure conditions is compatible 
with their agreed probability of occurrence. EASA [16] does 
not define these severities and probability levels because the 
work was still ongoing to reclassify the severity of failure 
conditions for UAS. Such definitions and probability values 
should be included in an update to the policy. As an interim 
position, EASA refers to the quantitative values applicable to 
requirement 1309 contained in the applicable airworthiness 
code used as the reference in defining the type-certification 
basis of the individual UAS, with as minimum the minimum 
values contained in AC 23.1309 for Class 1 aeroplanes [16]. 
EASA [16] addresses the intrinsic safety of the UAS, i.e. the 
certification of its airworthiness; it does not (yet) address the 
protection of other airspace users because this is dependent on 
ATC/ATM separation procedures and defined “detect and 
avoid” criteria, commensurate to the airspace class and type of 
operations (i.e. within or beyond visual line of sight). With the 
extension of EASA’s remit to also cover ATM/ANS, EASA 
will have to deal with the protection of airspace users as well. 
Risk categorization 
• Most severe are events which may cause a fatalities on the 
ground or in the air, for example because of loss of 
control; it is yet unclear whether there should be different 
risk levels for different amounts of fatalities, or not. 
• Next lower level of severity would be events that are 
unlikely to be fatal but may cause injuries. 
• Next lower levels of severity could involve ‘stress’, 
‘increased workload’, or ‘nuisance’, and ‘no effect’; all 
referenced sources seem to agree that these are of too low 
importance to further elaborate these now. 
 
Risk criteria 
The views on acceptability of risks are less consistent than for 
risk categorization. According to one line of reasoning, most 
UAS are equivalent to CS-23 aircraft because of their weight 
and number of people that could be at risk, and shall meet risk 
criteria applicable to CS-23 aircraft. According to another line 
of reasoning, UAS are too complex for comparison with CS-
23 aircraft, are equivalent with CS-25 aircraft, and shall 
therefore meet the risk criteria applicable to CS-25 aircraft. 
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UAS SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT 
METHODOLOGY 
It has been motivated that the main safety risks that need to be 
addressed before UAS can be introduced in Non Segregated 
Airspace without degrading safety are the risk of collision 
with objects on the ground and the risk of collision with other 
aircraft. Typically, SRM consists of five steps [9]: 
1. Describe the system to be introduced or changed; 
2. Identify the associated hazards and causal factors; 
3. Analyze risks (characterise the risk elements in terms of 
both hazard severity and likelihood of occurrence); 
4. Assess risks (and provide results for decision making); 
5. Treat/control the risks (i.e. mitigate, monitor and track). 
 
RISK OF A UAS GROUND COLLISION 
Scope and objective 
The objective is to obtain insight into the various UAS hazards 
and causal factors and their contribution to third party risk. 
Therefore, the assessment will have to focus on accident 
scenarios that may result in a collision with the ground. The 
effect of UAS hazards, causal factors and characteristics that 
contribute to third party risk will have to be investigated: 
 Mass and size; 
 Velocities (groundspeed, stalling speed, operating speed); 
 Data link and control system failures; 
 Automatic recovery systems and procedures; 
 Avionics system failures; 
 Adverse weather (e.g. wind-shear, clear air turbulence). 
 
Identification of hazards and causal factors 
Aviation accidents tend to result from a combination of many 
different causal factors (human errors, technical failures, 
environmental and management influences) in certain accident 
categories, whose causes and consequences differ according to 
the phase of flight in which they occur. The CATS project 
approached this complexity by developing 37 separate causal 
models for each accident category in commercial air transport 
[20]. These in turn are represented as Event Sequence 
Diagrams (ESDs) and Fault Trees (FTs). The FTs provide a 
logical structure showing how causal factors could combine to 
cause an event of the ESD. The ESD shows how combinations 
of these events may cause an accident. Only hazards that may 
result in a ground collision are considered. A review of the 
original 37 CATS scenarios has yielded fifteen relevant ESDs 
applicable to UAS operations. Five UAS specific ESDs can be 
added to cover UAS specific hazards that are not expected to 
occur in manned aviation. The result is provided in Table 1 
[35]. Note that the expected consequences of a UAS mid air 
collision (ESD 43) are that aircraft parts will collide with the 
ground. Similarly, ESD 44 represents a part falling down due 
to e.g. maintenance and/or design failure, maneuvering outside 
the flight envelope, severe turbulence conditions or cargo fall. 
Table 1 UAS hazards that might result in a ground collision 
# Name of the Event Sequence Diagrams 
5 Operation of UAS by remote pilot inappropriate 
6 UAS takes off with contaminated wing 
7 Weight and balance outside limits (takeoff) 
8 UAS encounters performance decreasing windshear   
11 Fire on board UAS 
12 Remote pilot spatially disorientated 
13 Flight control system failure 
14 Remote pilot(s) incapacitation 
15 Anti-ice system not operating 
16 Flight instrument failure 
17 UAS encounters adverse weather 
18 Single engine failure 
19 Unstable approach 
21 Weight and balance outside limits (approach/landing) 
37 Wake vortex encounter 
40 UAS positional information system failure 
41 UAS data link failure 
42 Unnatural conditions in UAS Ground Control Station 
43 UAS mid air collision 
44 A part of the UAS falls down 
 
Risk analysis 
Usually Individual Risk and the Societal Risk are analyzed. A 
typical method consists of 3 sub-models, which answer three 
questions regarding the risk of UAS to objects on the ground: 
1. What is the chance that a UAS accident occurs?  
2. What is the likelihood of a UAS accident occurring on a 
given location, given that a UAS accident occurred?  
3. What is the consequence of a UAS accident, given that a 
UAS accident occurred at a given location?  
 
The accident probability model is used to determine frequency 
of occurrence of a UAS accident that causes potentially third 
party damage or fatalities on the ground. Based on the UAS 
accident and accident avoidance scenarios as listed in Table 1, 
safety requirements (maximum allowable probabilities) for 
each of the hazards and causes represented in the associated 
FTs are derived. The accident location model is the likelihood 
of a UAS accident occurring on a given location, given that a 
UAS accident occurred. This model will provide a two-
dimensional probability distribution function that is tailored to 
route network and sector traffic in the non segregated airspace 
to be investigated. The consequences of a UAS accident in 
terms of affected area and fatal injuries are expressed in the 
accident consequence model. In this model, the area affected 
by a UAS accident is defined as consequence area, whereas 
the chance of a fatal injury inside this consequence area is 
defined as lethality (ratio of the number of third party fatalities 
and number of people in the consequence area). The models 
are combined to calculate individual risk and societal risk. 
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Risk assessment 
From the viewpoint of introducing UAS operations in Non 
Segregated Airspace, it is not desirable that a future risk 
situation will be worse than the current situation. A ‘stand-
still’ principle should apply. If a) the distribution of UAS 
accident locations is expected to show a similar pattern as 
manned aircraft, and b) third party consequences are expected 
to be similar for UAS and comparable manned aircraft, one 
could aim to ‘maintain existing accident rates’. By keeping the 
UAS accident probability comparable with the current 
accident probability for manned aircraft, one would under 
these assumptions then achieve ‘stand still’ third party risk. 
RISK OF COLLISION OF A UAS WITH 
OTHER (MANNED) AIRCRAFT 
Scope and objectives 
The objective is to obtain insight in the relative importance of 
the various UAS characteristics and their relative contribution 
to the collision risk for operations in Non Segregated 
Airspace. Therefore, the assessment will have to be based on a 
comparison between baseline commercial air traffic only 
versus a traffic mix including UAS. A distinction between the 
different components of collision risk will have to be made; 
conflict scenarios that cover vertical collision risk and conflict 
scenarios that cover horizontal collision risk. For both, a 
distinction will have to be made between risk arising in the 
normal operation (technical risk) and risks due to operational 
error and non-nominal operating conditions (including pilot 
error). The effect of different UAS factors that may contribute 
to collision risk will have to be investigated: 
• Performance characteristics and size; 
• Detect and Avoid system performance characteristics; 
• Command and control link characteristics; 
• Procedures for contingencies and recovery procedures; 
• Lateral or vertical separation minimum (standard). 
 
Identification of hazards and causal factors 
To adequately control collision risk in controlled IFR airspace, 
air traffic controllers apply separation minima (lateral and 
vertical separation standards). The methods used to achieve 
separation are varied and complex, depending on the phase of 
flight and the relative trajectories of the aircraft involved:  
• Vertical separation is achieved by requiring aircraft to use 
a prescribed altimeter pressure setting within designated 
airspace, and to operate at different levels expressed in 
terms of altitude/flight level. Minimum vertical separation 
for IFR flight is 1000 ft (300 m) below FL290 and 2000 ft 
(600 m) above FL290, except where RVSM applies.  
• Lateral separation is achieved by various means, which 
include a) position reports which indicate the aircraft are 
over different geographic locations, b) requiring aircraft 
to fly on specified tracks separated by a minimum angle. 
 Longitudinal separation is applied so that the aircraft 
spacing is never less than a specified amount. For aircraft 
following same or diverging tracks, this may be achieved 
by requiring aircraft to make position reports (and 
comparing times) and by speed control.  
 
Details of the separation applied depend on circumstances. In 
controlled IFR airspace, separation depends on route network: 
1. Aircraft on two parallel tracks separated by a lateral 
separation minimum (standard). 
2. Aircraft on multiple (near-) parallel tracks. 
3. Aircraft flying in the same direction on the same flight 
level of the same track. 
4. Aircraft on different flight levels of the same track, flying 
in the same or opposite directions. 
5. Aircraft flying on the same flight level of intersecting 
tracks. 
6. Aircraft flying on different flight levels of intersecting 
tracks. 
 
In view of collision risk, one difference between manned 
aircraft and unmanned aircraft is the fact that the UAS pilot 
may not at all times be able to immediate control the flight. 
Failure modes related to the use of a ground-air data link could 
induce a time latency of pilot command and control actions or 
may even lead to complete loss of control. Other possible 
differences that might negatively impact operator errors and 
collision risk are e.g. single pilot operations and autonomous 
flight recovery. Issues to be considered are: 
1. Introduction of many UAS leads to a different traffic mix, 
which increases the complexity. 
2. Increased pilot errors (due to lack of proficiency, 
automation confusion/distraction, increased workload, 
single pilot operations), increased communication errors 
with ATC and increased ATC errors due to misinterpreted 
performance characteristic of UAS are expected to lead to 
track deviations or longitudinal errors (horizontal 
deviations) and vertical deviations (including level busts). 
 
One should be aware that for small UAS operating among 
larger commercial aircraft implies that wake vortex encounters 
are likely more severe when UAS are crossing below such 
aircraft, and may then potentially need to be addressed as well. 
 
Potential causes of the risk of collision between a UAS and 
other (manned) aircraft should be identified. This may be done 
in the form of “conflict scenarios”, which will serve as a basis 
for collision risk modeling and assessment. The conflict 
scenarios are to cover both nominal and non-nominal aircraft 
and pilot behavior. Examples of conflict scenarios are level 
busts, aircraft leveling off at different flight levels than being 
cleared for, and additional errors due to single pilot operations. 
It may be questioned whether UAS will increase collision risk 
by being slower or faster than manned aircraft and/or by 
having larger or more frequent flight path deviations. There 
are two specific issues that are to be investigated for UAS: 
1. Assessment of collision risk for a traffic mix with UAS; 
2. Evaluation of applicability existing separation standards. 
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Risk analysis 
It is an option to start with high-level qualitative collision risk 
assessment (taking into account different conflict scenarios 
defined) and assess the different contributions of UAS aircraft 
performance, navigation performance and human factors to 
the different components of collision risk (lateral, vertical, 
longitudinal). Following such a qualitative study, a more 
sophisticated collision risk model may be developed and used 
in order to capture in more detail dynamics of the scenarios. 
Collision risk assessment. The assessment may be based on a 
comparison between a baseline of commercial air traffic only 
versus a traffic mix including UAS. Collision risk models will 
be used for assessment of the effect of UAS on different 
components of collision risk (lateral, vertical, longitudinal) 
and the effect of different factors that may contribute to 
collision risk, such as speed difference, navigation 
performance and conflict scenarios. For characterizing the 
collision risk, it is suggested to use the unified framework for 
collision risk modeling as described in the ICAO Circular 319-
AN/181 [33]. NLR provides three mathematical risk models 
that could possibly be used for three conflict scenarios [34]: 
• Loss of control due to wake vortex encounter 
• Mid-air collision due to vertical deviations 
• Mid-air collision due to horizontal deviations. 
 
Evaluation of separation standards. The applicability of the 
existing separation standards (lateral, longitudinal and 
vertical) for en-route air space and TMA for a traffic mix 
including UAS will have to be evaluated. A particular issue to 
investigate is whether or not data link failures (loss of control 
link, time latency issues) could imply a need for increased 
separation. Given a smaller size of the UAS as compared to 
commercial aircraft, the effect of wake vortices generated by 
(large) manned aircraft on the controllability of a UAS may 
need to be studied as well. Results could be used to decide 
whether separate pathways or ‘tubes’ will need to be 
introduced for UAS at high altitude en-route airways and what 
the possible size of such tubes would then have to be. 
Risk assessment 
The main task is to compare the estimated collision risk with 
acceptability criteria defined within a risk criteria framework. 
There are two basic methods for determining whether a system 
is acceptably safe: a) relative (comparison with a reference 
system) or b) absolute (evaluation of system risk against 
threshold(s)). The comparison methodology is usually applied 
if the reference system is proven to be safe (historically or 
theoretically) and if the assessed system is very similar to the 
reference in the risk-related aspects. The threshold(s) in the 
second method are usually referred to as a TLS. In order to 
ensure with a predetermined level of confidence that the 
estimated risk is below the TLS, it would be necessary that 
e ch calculation step in the risk assessment leads to an exact 
or conservative value. See the previous section for guidance. 
BUILDING THE SAFETY CASE 
The results from the proposed UAS SRM process are being 
used by NLR to produce a ‘Safety Case’ for introduction of 
UAS in non-segregated airspace. A Safety Case is defined as 
‘documented assurance of the achievement and maintenance 
of safety’ [19]. It is a means of structuring and documenting a 
summary of Safety Assessment results, and other activities 
(e.g. simulations, surveys, etc.), in a way that a reader can 
follow the reasoning as to why a change (or on-going service) 
can be considered safe. A Safety Case consists of a set of 
safety arguments together with safety evidence to show that all 
arguments are valid. Figure 2 represents a project lifecycle, in 
which a Safety Argument is a statement to claim that a concept 
is safe. The top-level Claim states that an operational concept 
is acceptably safe, by referring to a risk criteria framework 
that would be either absolute, relative, and/or ALARP based. 
 
 
Figure 2 Safety throughout the project lifecycle [19] 
An initial Safety argument for introduction of UAS operations 
in non segregated Airspace would start with the Claim that the 
aviation system, following the introduction of UAS, will (still) 
be acceptably safe (see Figure 3 for a proposed starting point). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Initial safety argument for the introduction of UAS 
The Safety Evidence to be gathered will have to be used to 
construct the justification that the concept is sufficiently safe 
to be operated in the foreseen environment. The justification 
of safety may be submitted to aviation regulators for approval. 
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SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS 
Although UAS have already been used in segregated airspace 
where separation from other traffic is assured, many see 
requirements to deploy UAS in non segregated airspace. A 
UAS SRM framework, supporting regulators and applicants of 
new proposed UAS operations through provision of guidelines 
for each SRM step to be conducted, has been proposed. 
 
A survey of UAS activities has provided an initial view on the 
risks and hazards to be considered, the needs and role of 
potential SRM users, the scope of the aviation system to be 
considered, the risks to be regulated, selection of suitable risk 
metrics, and the setting of an acceptable level of safety. It has 
been motivated that the main safety risks to be addressed to 
ensure that UAS can be introduced in non segregated airspace 
without degrading safety are risks to other airspace users and 
third party risk (to objects on the ground).  It will be necessary 
to show that these risks do not increase as compared to the 
current aviation system with manned aircraft only. 
 
The proposed SRM process follows five sequential steps: 
1. Describe the system to be introduced or changed; 
2. Identify the associated hazards and causal factors; 
3. Analyze risks (characterise the risk elements in terms of 
both hazard severity and likelihood of occurrence); 
4. Assess risks (and provide results for decision making); 
5. Treat/control the risks (i.e. mitigate, monitor and track). 
 
The proposed SRM process for risks to other airspace users is 
based on comparison of the collision risk for a baseline of 
commercial air traffic versus a traffic mix that includes UAS, 
using the ICAO unified framework for collision risk modeling. 
The proposed SRM process for third party risk is based on a 
method that combines an accident probability model with an 
accident location model and an accident consequence model, 
through answering three key questions: 
1. What is the chance that a UAS accident occurs?  
2. What is the likelihood of a UAS accident occurring on a 
given location, given that a UAS accident occurred?  
3. What is the consequence of a UAS accident, given that a 
UAS accident occurred at a given location?  
 
It has been explained how the results of the SRM process are 
being used to build a Safety Case for UAS operations in non 
segregated airspace. It is recommended to apply and validate 
the proposed SRM process with an operational concept 
brought forward by EUROCAE WG73 and/or RTCA-SC203. 
 
However, it should be noted that a commonly agreed risk 
criteria framework for UAS operations does not yet exist. 
Such framework, which has to be defined by regulators, is 
crucial for judging the acceptability of risk. This paper 
provides guidelines for the establishment of such framework, 
but the actual implementation should preferably be done 
jointly by a group that includes EASA, FAA and/or JARUS.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AC Advisory Circular 
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
ANS Air Navigation Services 
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATCO Air Traffic Controller 
ATM 
 
Air Traffic Management 
ATO Air Traffic Organization 
AOC Air Operator Certificate 
CATS Causal model for Air Transport Safety 
CBP Customs and Border Protection 
CS Certification Specification 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
ESARR Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Requirement 
ESD Event Sequence Diagram 
EUROCAE Europe Organization Civil Aviation Equipment 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations 
FL Flight Level 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FT Fault Tree 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
JARUS Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on UAS 
NATO 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAS National Aviation System 
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System 
R&D Research and Development 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SARP Standards and Recommended Practices 
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research 
SMS Safety Management System 
SRM Safety Risk Management 
STANAG Standardization Agreement 
TLS Target Level of Safety 
UA Unmanned Aircraft 
UAS Unmanned Aircraft System 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCS UAS Control Station 
UK United Kingdom 
VOL Value Of Life 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VWP Value Willing to Pay 
 
